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OREGON LAW REVIEW
MAINTENANCE OF RESALE PRICES *
PAUL A. SAYRE**
Among the legal problems relating to the distribution
of commodities, none has received more attention during
the past few years than that of the maintenance of resale
prices. Various bills have been introduced in Congress
for the purpose of legalizing price fixing by the producer.1
At the same time the courts and the Federal Trade Commission have been trying to establish some definite policy. The
rights of patentees, and the fact that combination has been
present in many cases, has further complicated the problem.
Price maintenance is the term applied to that marketing
policy, which consists of the imposition by the producer of
restrictions upon the price at which an article identified by
brand, trade mark, copyright or patent may be resold by
dealers. Note that price maintenance as used here refers
only to identified goods.
My thesis is that the doctrine of the United States
Supreme Court on the maintenance of resale prices is unwarranted.
Owing to the immensity of the question and the great
number of decisions, it will be impossible to exhaust the
subject in this limited discussion.! I shall deal chiefly with
decisions of the federal courts for several reasons: These
questions usually arise in interstate or foreign commerce,
which gives the federal courts jurisdiction, the federal
statutes which make restraints of trade and monopoly a
misdemeanor give the federal courts a jurisdiction where
frequently there would be no ground for action in the state
courts; furthermore, the Federal Trade Commission investigates cases of unfair competition and restraint of trade
on its own initiative and appeals are taken in the circuit
court of appeals. The result of all this is to make the jurisdiction of the federal courts paramount.
The methods used by manufacturers and producers of
identified goods, to maintain resale prices, fall into four
*Winning argument in the Hilton prize contest.
** Second year law student, University of Oregon.
1 The Stevens bill and the Kelly bill.
2A good discussion and collection of authorities will be found in 7 A. L.
R. 449, 19 A. L. R. 925, and 32 A. L. R. 1087.
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groups, namely: the rebate, agency, contract, and boycott
methods. This grouping is the one generally recognized
by the courts. By the rebate method the producer sells his
product to the dealer at a price so high that the dealer
cannot make any profit if he sells at the indicated price.
But if he sells at the indicated price he is entitled to a rebate
or bonus which in the end yields a good return. Such contracts have never been held illegal and have been affirmatively enforced in a number of cases.'
Many of the large manufacturers maintain their own
system of distribution and thereby control the resale prices
of their product. The dealers are constituted agents of the
manufacturer. When the relation of principal and agent
exists, it has been held that there is no illegality in the fact
that the manufacturer fixes the price at which his sales
agent must sell.'
The contract system presents more difficulties. Contracts often create combinations and restraints of trade
other than the fixing of resale prices. It is, therefore, difficult to say in many cases whether the price fixing element
was in itself considered illegal. Prior to 1911 there were
no cases holding that price fixing agreements of themselves
were bad, whereas a number of cases upheld such agreements.' It is true that some of these cases involved questions of patents and copyrights, but it has since been held
that the owner of a patent or copyright has no better right
to make restrictions on the sale of his article than any other
manufacturer.' In 1911 the United States Supreme Court
in Miles v. Park' held that an agreement to fix resale prices
was illegal, and since then the federal courts have followed
that decision.'
a Whitwcll v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 454 (1903); Clark v.
Frank, 17 Mo. App. 602 (1885); In re Greene, 52 Fed. 104 (1892).
4Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 227 U. S. 8 (1913); Locker v.
American Tobacco Co., 218 Fed. 447 (1914); Cole Motor Car Co. v. Hurst,
228 Fed. 280 (1915).
5 Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70 (1902); Fowle v. Park,
131 U. S. 88 (1889); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Goldthwaite, 133 Fed. 794
(1904); Jayne v. Loder, 149 Fed. 21 (1906).
6Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1 (1913); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,
210 U. S. 339 (1908).
7 220 U. S. 373 (1911).
8 Waltham Watch Co. v. Keene, 202 Fed. 225 (1913); Kellogg Toasted
Corn Flake Co. v. Buck, 208 Fed, 383 (1913); U. S. v. Kellogg Toasted
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The other method employed is what is sometimes called
the boycott. The manufacturer suggests prices and refuses
to sell to those who will not adhere thereto. In United
States v. Colgate & Co.,' this method was held legal by
the United States Supreme Court. Three years later the
Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Beechnut
Packing Co.1" modified their ruling made in the Colgate
case. In the Beechnut case it was held that although a
manufacturer may refuse to sell, he cannot through salesmen, other dealers, or special agents, gather information
about price cutters and maintain a black list of persons to
whom he will not sell. It appears from these decisions of
the United States Supreme Court that a manufacturer at
the present time cannot contract with his dealers to resell
his product at a stipulated price, nor may he employ an
active boycott in attaining that end. Unless he can maintain an agency system, which small producers cannot do,
or a rebate system or the boycott method so far as it is
legal, he is powerless to fix the resale price of his article.
The question is whether the doctrine of the Supreme
Court as enunciated by these decisions is warranted. An
examination of the Miles case, which is the fountain head
of this doctrine, will present the points of controversy. This
case involved a series of contracts which had for their purpose the fixing of resale prices on certain unpatented medicines. The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice
Hughes, and a strong dissenting opinion was written by
Mr. Justice Holmes. I interpret Mr. Hughes' argument
as based on two grounds; first, that a price fixing agreement violates the rule against restraints on alienation, and
second, that it is an unlawful restraint of trade.
Assuming then that our contract to maintain the indicated price is otherwise a good and valid one, is it a restraint on alienation? Is the dealer hampered in passing
good title to the purchaser? It is evident that there is no
reversion in the manufacturer. He cannot reclaim his
product if the price fixing agreement is violated. The right
Corn Flake Co., 222 Fed. 725 (1915); Boston Store v. American Graphaphone
Co., 246 U. S. 8, Ann. Cas. 1918 C, 447 (1918); American Tobacco Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 9 Fed. (2d) 570 (1925).
9250 U. S. 300 (1919).
Lo257 U. S. 441 (1922).
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is only a personal one growing out of the breach of contract. He may get rights against the dealer, or against
one who interferes with that right, but that does not affect
the free alienability of the article. As Mr. Justice Holmes
said, it is borrowing a principle from another field of law
and applying it where it does not belong.11
Even though the contract does restrain alienation, it is
not necessarily fatal if we apply the doctrine of restraint
on alienation in its entirety. Restrictive covenants, which
restrain the alienation of land, are valid if the restriction is
reasonable both in respect to parties and to the public. If
the vendee of land covenants not to carry on a certain business which would injure the vendor's use of the adjoining
land, then the covenant is generally enforced. Moreover,
a manufacturer may require that his product be resold in
the original carton or package and no objection is made to
the restriction on alienation. It is deemed necessary to
allow such restrictions in order to protect the producer's
good will. Is it not just as necessary to protect the manufacturer against a price-cutter who preys on good will?
The second point is that in which Mr. Hughes attacks
price fixing agreements as being an unlawful restraint of
trade. An analysis of the reasoning and a study of monopolies will disclose a fallacy in the argument and show
where the conclusion is erroneous. Economists for certain
purposes classify monopolies as vertical and horizontal.
Horizontal monopoly is the union under single management of a number of enterprises of the same sort. It is
based on the control of the supply of a given article which
brings into play an unnatural force which may be exerted
for the purpose of boosting prices. The dangerous element
is the power which it affords and which is not one of the
natural laws of competitive business. This form of organization or monopoly has been almost universally condemned.
Vertical monopoly refers to the control of the successive steps in the production and distribution of a given
article. In that manner Henry Ford has built up one of
the greatest vertical monopolies that has ever been known.
He controls his product from the mine and forest direct
to the consumer. But has competition in the automobile
n1Miles v. Park, aupra, note 7.
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industry been lessened? It has had exactly the opposite
effect. This form of organization has increased efficiency
and competition to the nth degree. It is difficult to see
where this form of monopoly is injurious. We have only
to look about us to see that vertical monopolies built on
the idea of combining manufacturing and distribution are
in universal use because it makes for efficiency. Some control the distribution directly, some through agents, some
through rebate systems and some through a boycott system. It is only fair to the small manufacturer who is not
able to use these other methods that we should allow him
to get the same results through price fixing agreements.
Let us see if Mr. Hughes considered this view of the
question. He says, as regards restraint of trade:1" "As to
this, the complainant can fare no better with its plan of
identical contracts than could the dealers themselves if
they formed a combination and endeavored to establish the
same restrictions, and thus to achieve the same result, by
agreement with each other."
It is evident from this statement that Mr. Hughes
recognized the difference between vertical and horizontal
monopoly and endeavored to bring this case under the latter. His argument was this: A combination of dealers to
set prices is illegal. Such combination is in the form of
horizontal monopoly and is admittedly bad. He then says
that complainant achieved the same result with his series
of contracts and that because the contracts obtained the
same result as the combination of dealers they are likewise
illegal. This does not necessarily follow. Every successful
maintenance of resale prices is not illegal, for the courts
have allowed price maintenance by the rebate, agency and
boycott methods.
The Supreme Court doctrine is not that resale price
maintenance is bad, but that contracts to maintain resale
prices are illegal. Mr. Hughes' argument goes too far. It
is in conflict with the adjudications upholding resale price
maintenance by the agency, rebate and boycott methods.
In holding resale contracts void, the courts have based
their decisions on both the common law and the statutes.
In 1890 Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
12 Miles

v. Park, supra, note 7.

246

OREGON LAW REVIEW

which declared monopolies and restraints of trade a misdemeanor and extended the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. The Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act passed in 1914, and the Webb Act, passed in 1918,
supplemented the Sherman Act. In none of these was a
definition of restraint of trade or monopoly given. These
acts relate to administration and make restraint of trade
a criminal offense. To find what the terms mean we must
go to the common law. Mr. Justice White in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 8 speaking in regard to the terms "restraint of trade" and "monopoly," as used in the Sherman
Act, said: "It is certain that those terms, at least in their
rudimentary meaning, took their origin in the common
law and were familiar in the law of this country prior to
and at the time of the adoption of the act in question."
To determine what unlawful restraint of trade is, let
us examine the common law. We find that in the very
earliest times any restraint of trade, however slight, was
unlawful. These were usually such restraints as result
from the contract made between the vendor and vendee,
as for example, when in selling his blacksmith shop, the
vendor promises not to engage in that business.
Very early it appeared that to allow no power whatever
to restrain was too harsh. All contracts involve restriction
on the promisor and in some aspects can be viewed as restraint of trade. The courts, therefore, have evolved the
rule that reasonable restraint of trade is allowable. This
was set out in definite form for the first time in 1711 in
Mitchel v. Reynolds." The test of reasonableness has been
applied to many diverse situations. Where the restriction
is ancillary to the sale of a business or a term of employment, it is generally conceded to be valid if reasonable. It
follows, that if the vendor of the blacksmith shop contracted with the buyer not to open a shop in that town for
five years, it was generally considered reasonable because
the restriction was only such as was necessary to protect
the good-will which was sold. If the contract not to compete was so broad as not to be merely ancillary to the sale
of the business then it was unreasonable. There was an
13 221 U. 8. 1, 51 (1910).

14 1 P. Wins. 181.
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injury to the covenantor and to the public because it interfered with the covenantor's right to earn a livelihood and
deprived the public of his services, without a corresponding
benefit to the covenantee. This rule of reasonableness is
not limited to contracts ancillary to a sale of a business or
a term of employment, but extends to other cases of restraint of trade where the restriction is imposed to protect
an appropriate and legitimate interest of the covenantee."
Price fixing agreements are a type of restraint of trade
of comparatively recent origin. Mr. Justice Phillmore,
speaking in a recent English decision, 6 said, "Price maintenance agreements are modern things and are strange
to those who have been brought up on the older lines, but
they are in almost universal commercial use and it would
be a scandal if they could not be enforced."
The English courts have applied the rule of reasonableness to price fixing agreements and have found them
valid.' Mr. Hughes in his opinion in the Miles case stated
the rule as follows: "To sustain the restraint, it must be
found to be reasonable both with respect to the public and
to the parties and that it is limited to what is fairly necessary, in the circumstances of the particular case, for the
protection of the covenantee."
Let us apply Mr. Hughes' rule to the price fixing contract. Suppose the manufacturer has spent large sums of
money and years of time in perfecting his product and in
advertising it. He has built up a good will which is a valuable asset in his business. It is only fair to the manufacturer to require the dealer to respect this property right
and not to sell at a price which injures the manufacturer
in his business. Such a contract does not interfere with the
covenantee's right to earn a livelihood as does the agreement in the blacksmith case. It is evident that as between
the parties there is no injury.
If the price fixing contract is to be declared unreasonable, it must be because it injures the public. Whether the
i- Hall Mfg. Co. v. Western Steel & Iron Works, 227 Fed. 588, 592
(1915); Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 64, 22 L. ed. 315 (1873);
Noraenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., Limited, [1894]

A. C. 535.
16

Dunlop Pneumatie Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co., 29 T. L. R. 270 (1913).

17 Elliman v. Carrington, [1901] 2 Ch. 275.
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public is benefited or injured by price maintenance is an
economic question and merits our consideration from that
standpoint. One of the best articles to be found presenting
the case against price maintenance is that of W. H. S.
Stevens.18 He argues that price fixing agreements are unfair, first to the efficient jobber, second to the non-price
maintaining manufacturer, and third to consumers and
public generally. As to the first point, Mr. Stevens seems
to think that it is unfair to the jobber who can handle his
business more efficiently than his competitors to deprive
him of the right to cut prices and gain a further advantage
over those competitors. The weakness of this argument,
as pointed out by Professor E. W. Puttkammer,"9 is the
assumption that the efficient jobber will be the one to cut
prices. It is more likely that the price-cutter will not be
the efficient jobber, but the one who has not a successful
business, and hopes to attract customers who will buy
other goods, on which he makes a profit sufficient to cover
the loss on the cut price article.
Mr. Stevens' second point is that price fixing is unfair
to the manufacturer who does not care to maintain the
resale price on his article. He says that if the price maintained article is preferred by dealers the manufacturer who
does not maintain prices is injured. But such a manufacturer has the right to advertise and create a demand for
his article as an identified one with respect to quality and
reduced price and it is unlikely that the price maintained
article if inferior in quality and higher in price can long
maintain its prestige and superior drawing powers. All
manufacturers would be competing under the same conditions and that should be sufficient to protect the producer
of non-price maintained goods as well as consumers
generally.
We next come to Mr. Stevens' last point, namely:
That price fixing agreements are unfair to the public generally. The alleged injury is that an increased price to
the consumer is caused by the maintenance of the resale
prices, and that competition is lessened. But is competition lessened? The manufacturers are still competing
18 19 Col. L. Rev. 265.

19 21 Ill. L. Rev. 389.
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with each other. In fact, the result is to concentrate the
competition there and make it sharper. Any loss of competition in price is made up by an increased competition
in quality and service. This increased emphasis on quality
and service is a much needed element in our modern merchandising. Price cutting has encouraged adulteration
in almost every line of goods.
Let me illustrate the influence of price maintenance
on competition. An eastern' manufacturer employed a
very large force. Most of these employees were getting
their luncheon at nearby eating houses. An intense rivalry
grew up between these eating houses, and as a result they
were cutting prices on luncheons to sixteen and seventeen
cents. They were making their bid on the price and cutting on the amount, which was causing malnutrition
among the employees. The manufacturer then went to
all the eating houses, and asked them to serve a standard
twenty cent luncheon. The competition immediately
swung to the quality and service. The employees were
able to get an adequate luncheon at a given price and the
arrangement was found to be much more satisfactory
than before.
The public gains a distinct social advantage from price
fixing agreements. The price fixing agreement forces the
competition back to the producer and lessens it among distributors. This no doubt does protect the small distributor
and corner grocery man. But is he not of value to society
as well as the chain store and large mail order house? The
small business is just as essential to society as the large
business and should be protected. Greater distribution of
wealth stabilizes the community.
There is a further advantage in the beneficial effect
on business as a whole. The producer who could plan his
business without danger of having his efforts brought to
naught by price cutters would be more willing to invest
his money. The inventor and small manufacturer would
have a chance to get started.
A legally effective price fixing agreement is not only
a benefit but a necessity as well. There has grown up of
late a form of competition which is exceedingly pernicious. This is what is known as predatory price cutting.
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Let me give an example. Suppose a manufacturer has
specialized on the production of a dollar alarm clock. He
has spent years of time and effort in building up his product and in selling it to the public. By sustained quality
and constant advertising a demand has been created for
this dollar alarm clock. His efforts are rewarded by the
approbation of the consuming public. But a merchant
down town is not thriving, and looks around for some
way to increase his business. He advertises in the paper
that he will sell this particular alarm clock for eighty-nine
cents. The public, knowing very well the quality of the
clock, are led to believe that this merchant is selling all
his merchandise at a cut rate. The merchant makes his
money back out of other articles on which he has not cut
the prices. The public has gained nothing in the long
run.
Other merchants, in order to meet the competition,
also cut the price. The price war which ensues has two
effects: first, it causes the merchant to push other goods
on which he can make a profit, and second, to demand a
cheaper price from the manufacturer. What is the manufacturer to do? He cannot cut his price without cheapening his article. He tries, therefore, to protect himself by
price fixing agreements with his dealers, but these are
declared illegal by the federal courts. The good will which
he has so laboriously built up has come to naught because
of that business parasite, the price cutter.
It follows that price fixing agreements are needed to
cope with the unscrupulous dealer who tears down the
prestige and drawing power of some manufacturer's product merely for the purpose of furthering his own ends.
Contracts to protect a legitimate interest of this sort should
be allowed.
In conclusion, we find that the invalidity of price fixing agreements depends on the rule of reasonableness
which is applied to all restraints of trade. We find that
these agreements do not create a combination which lessens competition but only shifts the competition from distributor to producer and from price to quality and service.
Price fixing agreements injure neither the parties to the
contract nor the public. In fact, we find distinct advan-
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tages in such a system. In view of these facts are we
justified in interfering with the freedom of contract?
A glance at the jurisdictions favoring price maintenance will disclose that the federal courts stand almost
alone on this doctrine. England, France, Germany, and
Denmark have taken a decided stand in favor of price
maintenance.20 A majority of the states favor price maintenance. 2 ' The important decisions handed down by the
Supreme Court have been by a divided bench. Mr. Holmes,
Mr. Brandeis, Mr. McReynolds, and Mr. McKenna have
all favored price maintenance." Why should we interfere
with contracts which bring sound economical results?
The country has gone mad on regulation. Our zeal for
regulation is only exceeded by our propensity for breaking the law. What the country needs is less regulation in
business and more business in regulation.
20 Report of the committee on the maintenance of resale prices at the
fourth annual meeting of the United States chamber of commerce (1916).
21 Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649 (1913); Park v.
National Druggist Association, 175 N. Y. 1 (1903).
22 Beechnut Case, supra, note 10.

